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of recorded history. Exodus 23:8 enjoins us from bribery: "And you shall
take no bribe, for a bribe blinds the clear-sighted and subverts the cause
of those who are in the right." Even a cursory look at history reveals that
the problem of public corruption is as old as Methuselah-but the fact
that there is a problem does not mean that prosecutors ought to ignore the
intent of Congress and legislate their own solution. Yet that is precisely
what they are doing.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)' is a supply-side statutethat is, it criminalizes bribe giving but not bribe taking by foreign
officials. Accordingly, and until recently, prosecutors followed a supplyside strategy by prosecuting bribe givers and not government bribe takers.
But more and more, prosecutors are taking the fight to the bribe takersin other words, including a demand-side approach to the offensive. They
are doing so by charging corrupt foreign officials under statutes such as
the Travel Act 2 and the Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA). 3 This
newly minted strategy was not contemplated by Congress, which left
foreign officials out of the FCPA.
There may be several motives for this new stratagem. It may be that
the United States is starting to feel that the FCPA has given way to the
U.K. Bribery Act as the most feared anti-bribery law on the globe. For
instance, the U.K. Bribery Act prohibits both supply-side and demandside bribery-in other words, it is aimed at bribe givers as well as bribe
takers.4 It may simply be that the United States is trying to keep up.
Another reason may be the notion that if bribe takers share some
prosecution risk with bribe givers, the market for bribes might shrink. If
foreign officials do not feel any risk of being prosecuted, they will persist
in coercing companies into making payments to procure business. This
new stratagem might deter them from doing so.
Finally, it might be a belief that American corporations are for the
most part committed to the rule of law, free competition and good
citizenship, and no matter how much they do to comply, they cannot stop
the barrage of extortionate demands for bribes in foreign markets. The
United States might simply be trying to reduce bribe solicitation to ease
the burden on American companies doing business abroad.
Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that the United States is taking
a new approach to charging foreign officials who would not otherwise be
accountable for taking bribes under the FCPA. No matter how good their
reasons, prosecutors should not be permitted to go around the policy
decisions made by Congress in the FCPA and essentially become
legislators themselves.
1.
2.
3.
4.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2014).
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2012).
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 2 (U.K.).
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I. FCPA
A. History
After the Watergate scandal, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) investigated certain corporations that had donated to
political-election campaigns, including the re-election campaign of thenPresident Nixon.5 Because of its work and that of the special prosecutor,
several corporations were charged with making illegal political
contributions with corporate funds.6 The investigation revealed the
existence of "slush funds" that many corporations kept off the books,
sometimes in offshore bank accounts or shell companies created only to
fund bribes.' The discovery sounded an alarm because these illegal
payments could be significant to potential investors.8 It justifiably caused
concern about the disclosure system on which our financial system and
U.S. securities laws rest. 9
One of the infamous examples was that of Lockheed Corporation.' 0 It
had paid about $1.8 million in bribes to the Prime Minister of Japan
(among others) to obtain a contract for the sale of passenger aircraft."
This embarrassed the United States, given that Lockheed was seen almost
as an arm of the U.S. government.1 2 It was also the Cold-War era, during
3
which the United States thought of itself as the shining city on the hill.1
It was important to show that capitalism did not equal corruption as it
related to the fight against communism. 14
Congress also was concerned about more practical foreign policy
issues. It was troubled that many multinational enterprises and U.S.
5. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payment and Practices (1976), reprinted in Special
Supplement, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 353, at 2, 39-40 (May 19, 1976) [hereinafter SEC
Report on Corporate Payments]; see Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The ForeignCorrupt

PracticesAct-1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 89, 92 (2010).
6. SEC Report on Corporate Payments, supra note 5, at 2.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 3.
10.

See A. Carl Kotchian, The Payoff Lockheed's 70-Day Mission to Tokyo, SATURDAY

REv. (July 9, 1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 2 (1977), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1 977/houseprt-95-640.pdf.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 10, at 8-12; Mike Koehler, The Story of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 941 (2012); SEC Report on Corporate
Payments, supra note 5, at 40.

12. See Joseph W. Yockey, ChoosingGovernance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. CoRP.
L. 325, 338-39 (2013).
13.

See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign CorruptPractices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.

929, 939-41 (2012); S. REP. No. 95-114, at 2 (1977).
14. See Koehler, supra note 13, at 941.
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government agencies had been accused of attempting to subvert friendly
foreign governments.' 5 Congress was concerned that such conduct could
weaken friendly governments in the eyes of their own people, which was
counter to U.S. foreign-policy goals.' 6
Finally, broad economic arguments were made in support of a new
anti-bribery law. Besides undermining democracy and subverting
legitimate governments, bribery short-circuits free markets.' 7 Markets are
supposed to reward efficiency and quality. When bribes are paid,
resources go to the corrupt, not the efficient:
[Bribery] is counter to the moral expectations and values of the
American public. But not only is it unethical, it is bad business as
well. It erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market
system.... [I]t rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts
pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards or risk
losing business.' 8
The question was how to fix the problem. After scores of hearings,
Congress was worried that existing laws that possibly could have
addressed this type of corruption were deficient.1 9 For instance, the
securities laws had some gaping holes-they generally only required
disclosure of "material" facts. 20 Thus, under the securities laws, unless a
bribe was material, it did not need to be disclosed.2 ' It was not hard to
imagine a scenario where a company might decide that a small bribe
would not matter to an investor and therefore would deem it immaterial
and not report it. The tax laws also were found wanting, because under
those laws, making the payment is not the illegal act-the illegal act was
taking a tax deduction for the bribe as if it were a legitimate business
expense.22 No deduction, no crime-that was unacceptable.23 Finally, the
antitrust laws generally would not apply unless the bribe would have an
anticompetitive effect on U.S. foreign commerce.2 4 Congress wanted to

15.

The Activities of Multinational CorporationsAbroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm.

on Int'l Econ. Policy ofthe H. Comm. on Int '1 Relations, 94th Cong. 22 (1975) (statement of Mark
B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
16.

See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3-4 (1977); Statement of Comm'n Policy Concerning

Section 30a ofthe Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, Release No. 17099, at 2 (Aug. 28, 1980).
17. S. REP. No. 94-1031, at 3 (1976).
18. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).
19. See Koehler, supra note 13, at 950-60.
20. Id. at 951-55.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 954-56; I.R.C. § 162(c) (2011).
23. See Koehler, supra note 13, at 954-56.
24. See id at 955-56.
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close these gaps and find a way to prosecute overseas corruption. 25
So Congress acted and passed the FCPA as an amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.26 It was described as an effort to
"restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business
system." 7 But the FCPA only penalizes those who give the bribe and not
those who take it. 28 It was therefore an inside-out approach to tackling
corruption based on our own commitment to the rule of law.
This inside-out approach was very much intentional. Congress was
well aware that under international law the United States had the power
to reach conduct of noncitizens, including foreign bribe takers.2 9 What's
more, constitutionally, Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States"
and "to define and punish Offenses against the Law of Nations."30 Thus,
Congress arguably could have regulated the bribe takers based on
territoriality and the effects principles of jurisdiction. 3 1 But it chose not
to, doubtless constrained by notions of comity and the concern that
subjecting bribe takers in friendly foreign governments to criminal
liability would exacerbate foreign-policy problems.
Three decades later, it appears that the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the SEC have decided to work around the FCPA's limitations
and go after foreign-bribe takers. To understand their strategy, it is first
important to understand the basic structure of the FCPA and why these
agencies decided that they needed to go around the law in the first place.
B. Structure
The FCPA is essentially a two-part statute. 32 It contains both antibribery 33 and accounting provisions. 34 Most would agree that the antibribery provisions are the guts of the law. They define what is and is not
acceptable. 35 The accounting provisions are nevertheless also important
25. See id at 956-61.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
27. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977).
28. United States v. Castle, 925 F. 2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 835 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 12 n.3 (1977)).
30. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
31. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (upholding
jurisdiction in case against Noriega for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO) and Travel Act violations based on the effects doctrine).
32. U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, A Resource Guide to the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 10-11 (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf [hereinafter SEC & DOJ Guide].
33. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
34. See SEC & DOJ Guide, supra note 32, at 38; Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B).
35. See SEC & DOJ Guide, supra note 32, at 10-35.
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in that they require companies to disclose and monitor.3 6 It is this
transparency that sets apart American financial markets from some
others. 37 As a matter of procedure, the DOJ prosecutes all criminal
actions as well as civil proceedings against non-issuers of securities.3 8
The SEC handles civil actions against issuers. 39 Oftentimes, the two bring
parallel proceedings. 40
1. Anti-Bribery
The anti-bribery provisions forbid "issuers" and "domestic concerns"
from making or promising to make corrupt payments, either directly or
indirectly, of money, or anything of value, to foreign officials, 4 1 with
corrupt intent to retain or get business. 42 It is best to break down the
dictates of the statute into its constituent parts.
An "issuer" is a company that has registered securities or is required
to file reports with the SEC.4 3 A "domestic concern" is broader and
includes a "citizen, national, or resident of the United States" plus "any
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principle place of business in the United States, or which is organized
under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession,
or commonwealth of the United States." 44 The term "anything of value"
necessarily is not limited to money. 45 It can include gifts like cars, trips,
promise of future employment, and even gifts to charities.4 6
Next, the payment must be made to a "foreign official," 4 7 which
includes any officer or employee of a foreign government, a department,
agency or instrumentality of the government, and an foreign political
party, party official, or candidate for foreign office. 8 The FCPA also
36. Seeid.at4(-41.
37. No express private right ofaction exists in the Act for violation ofeither the anti-bribery
or the accounting provisions. See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th
Cir. 1990); McLean v. Int'l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987).
38. See SEC & DOJ Guide, supra note 32, at 4-5.
39. See id.
40. See id
41. It can be argued that the United States has taken an expansive role of defining who is
a foreign official.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(8). Foreign issuers whose American Depository Receipts are
listed on a U.S. exchange are "issuers" for purposes of the FCPA. See Cort Malmberg & Alison
B. Miller, Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 50 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2013).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(1)(A)-(B).
45. SEC & DOJ Guide, supra note 32, at 14-19.
46. Id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
48. The term has not been fully developed and there is not much case law explaining it.
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reaches a payment to any third party that is made with the knowledge that
part of it will be offered to bribe a foreign official. 49 Finally, what it
means to "obtain or retain business" is extremely fact-specific."o This
gives prosecutors some leeway, but also gives a defendant some room to
maneuver. Any covered person who "willfully" violates the anti-bribery
provisions can be both imprisoned and fined. 5
The anti-bribery provisions do not prohibit the acceptance of bribes
by foreign officials-they address only the supply side and not the
demand side of international corporate bribery. 52
2. Accounting
The "books-and-records" provisions of the FCPA are in some ways
more limited than the anti-bribery provisions, in that they apply only to
"issuers" of U.S. registered securities. 53 These accounting provisions
require those issuers to "make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuers." 54 However, the FCPA's
accounting provisions take into account that required controls should be
in proportion to the size of the corporation:
The definition of accounting controls does comprehend
reasonable, but not absolute, assurances that the objectives
expressed in it will be accomplished by the system. The concept of
"reasonable assurances" . . . recognizes that the costs of internal

controls should not exceed the benefits expected to be derived. It
does not appear that either the SEC or Congress, which adopted
the SEC's recommendations, intended that the statute should
require that each affected issuer install a fail-safe accounting
control system at all costs. It appears that Congress was fully
cognizant of the cost-effective considerations which confront
companies as they consider the institution of accounting controls
and of the subjective elements which may lead reasonable
individuals to arrive at different conclusions. Congress has
demanded only that judgment be exercised in applying the
standard of reasonableness.

. . .

It is also true that the internal

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), 78dd-l(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(a)(2), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(a)(2),
78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3); see United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir.
2011).
50. United States v. Kay, 359 F. 3d 738, 757 (5th Cir. 2004).
51. See United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 136 (2d Cir. 2011).
52. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991).
53. Malmberg & Miller, supra note 43, at 1083.
54. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2) (2012).
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accounting controls provisions contemplate the financial principle
or proportionality-what is material to a small company is not
necessarily material to a large company.
Albeit proportionally, the accounting provisions require a system of
internal controls that provide reasonable assurance that transactions are
properly authorized and recorded:
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differences .... 56
Thus, even a payment that is not tied to a bribe can lead to an
enforcement action under the accounting provisions if it is inaccurately
recorded or attributed to a deficiency in an internal-control program. This
does not mean that these provisions do not apply in an actual FCPA
violation case (for instance, if a bribe is booked under "cost of goods
sold" or something similar, it would violate the FCPA), only that it
enables prosecutors who find no actual bribe to go after a corporation.
The SEC also could use the accounting provisions to go after
commercial bribery-as opposed to bribing a foreign official-where
payments were inaccurately recorded. But beware, because a properly
recorded payment may later turn out to have been a bribe, in which case
the company just became the government's cartographers for its own
prosecution.
Just like the anti-bribery provisions, the accounting provisions also
failed to attack the demand-side of bribery.

55.
56.
57.

SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2012).
See In re York Int'l Corp., Secs. & Exch. Comm'n Litig. Release No. 20319 (Oct. 1,

2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr2O319.htm.
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C. Amendments
1. 1988 Amendments
The early 1980s were a period of economic recession in the United
States. As a result, companies were concerned that the FCPA was hurting
their competitiveness. Eventually, in 1988 Congress amended the FCPA
for the first time in Title V of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act.58 There were a few key amendments. First, the statute's application
was extended to anyone that violated the FCPA in the United States.s"
Second, Congress tried to distinguish between payments. It passed an
exception for "grease" payments made merely to facilitate "routine
governmental action" as opposed to those made in order to get an
improper benefit. 60 This exception allows payments to speed-up routine
matters like processing visas and work orders.61 It also reinforces its
respect for foreign sovereigns by adding an affirmative defense for
62
payments that are legal under the laws of the foreign country.
Thus, rather than promulgating an inflexible rule, the amendment
essentially placed the authority to define an acceptable payment in the
hands of the foreign sovereign. 63 It provides some guidance, while at the
same time giving foreign governments flexibility to establish their own
rules.64 In essence, a foreign government can now help define what
constitutes a crime under the FCPA-certainly a generous application of
international comity. This should silence those that might say the FCPA
is just another example of U.S. imperialism abroad.
Finally, the amendments allowed for payments that are bona-fide
65
expenses related to product promotion or contract performance.
Notably, the amendments did nothing to focus on the demand side of the
problem.
2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development AntiBribery Convention
After the FCPA's enactment, many American companies felt that they
were at a competitive disadvantage. After many years of trying to level
the playing field, in 1997 the Organization for Economic Co-operation
58.
102 Stat.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001-5003,
1107, 1115 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2012)).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012).
Id. § 78dd-l(b).
Id. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A).
Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1) (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 78dd-l(c)(2) (2012).
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and Development (OECD) adopted the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (the "OECD Convention"). The OECD Convention was an
important event in anti-bribery history for American companies. It
required that signatories ban the paying of bribes to government officials
as a means of doing business abroad. 66 Fourty-one countries have now
ratified the Convention.67 The OECD Convention helped readily expand
FCPA enforcement by the United States.6 8 Although it generally may be
said that policy makers around the world have concluded that it is not
only the corporations that are responsible-it is also the local politicians
or functionaries that are looking out for themselves and not their
compatriots-nevertheless, the OECD Convention is a supply-side
agreement. Prosecutors cannot look here to justify their recent stratagem
of self-legislating.
3. 1998 Amendments
The 1998 amendments were passed in pari passu with the OECD
Convention. 69 To make the FCPA conform to the OECD Convention,
Congress passed the International Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998 (the "1998 Amendment"). 70 The 1998 Amendment expanded
nationality jurisdiction by stating that any U.S. person or company that
violates the FCPA can be held liable regardless of whether they used any
means of interstate commerce. 7 1 Further, anyone who violates the FCPA
"while in the territory of the United States" also can be held liable.7 2 In
other words, the 1998 Amendment also added territorial jurisdiction over
foreign persons. Finally, it expanded the definition of "foreign official." 73
In line with the OECD Convention, the 1998 Amendments expanded the
definition of "foreign officials" to include officers and employees of
"public international organizations." 7 4 Nothing in the 1998 Amendments
66. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17,
1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43 (1998) [hereinafter International Business Transactions].
67. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Ratfication Status as
of December. 2012, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-briberylantibriberyconventionratification.pdf

(last viewed on Jan. 19, 2014).
68. Many countries criticize the United States for the way it chooses to enforce the FCPA.
They claim the United States uses its enforcement efforts as a pretext to punish foreign multinationals. This is not permitted by the OECD Convention's Article 5 mandate.
69. The Convention came into effect in 1999.
70. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(g), 78dd(2)(i) (2012).
72. Id.
73. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, supra note 70.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1) (2012).
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addressed the prosecution of bribe takers.
D. ExtraterritorialityofFCPA
If a U.S. national or company bribes a foreign official anywhere in the
world, the FCPA applies. Because it also applies to issuers, and many
foreign issuers deem it necessary to participate in U.S. securities markets,
the FCPA applies to many foreign corporations. This is still a
"nationality" approach to jurisdiction because it requires that the foreign
defendants have a significant connection to the United States because of
their participation in its securities markets. Moreover, although not
technically extraterritorial, the FCPA applies if a foreigner bribes a
foreign official anywhere and any act in furtherance of the bribe takes
place within the territory of the United States. Some might say that this
amounts to extraterritorial jurisdiction because, in practice, the nexus to
the United States does not have to be very strong.
For example, in its recently published resource guide, the DOJ and
SEC affirmed their position that even "placing a telephone call or sending
an email, text message, or fax from, to, or through the United States" is
sufficient.75 So, if you sent an email from one foreign country to another

without having any idea that the server through which your email
travelled was in the United States, you still would be subject to FCPA
liability. Sending a wire transfer of a purely foreign bribe to or from a
bank in the United States (or otherwise using the U.S. banking system)
also exposes a foreign bribe giver to FCPA liability. 76 The DOJ and SEC
also have clarified that there is liability for aiding and abetting and
conspiring to violate the FCPA if any act in furtherance of the crime took
place within the United States. 77 Therefore, the government can prosecute
a violation even if most of the activity took place outside the United
States. In fact, some of the largest FCPA settlements have been with
foreign corporations (Siemens paid approximately $800 million to settle
its FCPA issues).
But despite the extraterritorial reach of the statute, nothing in it
criminalizes the conduct of bribe takers.
II. THE NEw APPROACHES: RECENT DEMAND-SIDE PROSECUTIONS

Since the FCPA's birth, companies generally have felt that it was
75. SEC & DOJ Guide, supra note 32.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 34.
78. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for
Engaging in Worldwide Bribery No. 2008-294 (Dec. 15, 2008).
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unfair to make the FCPA strictly a supply-side statute. Many felt foreign
officials were extorting them, yet extortion applied only to threats of
violence.7 9 In other words, a duress defense was unavailable if there was
a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law-which was usually
the case in an economic-threat scenario.8 0 The OECD Convention
similarly excludes threats to economic advantage. 8 ' Although companies
are justified in their complaints, the DOJ and SEC (and the President)
should not be able to ignore congressional intent. In the long run, the
companies being extorted will be harmed if prosecutors are allowed to
expand criminal statutes however they like.
But first, we examine some of the clever ways prosecutors are trying
to circumvent the FCPA's limitations and prosecute bribe takers. These
include Presidential Proclamations and federal prosecutions under the
Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA) and the Travel Act. Before
getting to specific cases, we will take a general look at these
proclamations and laws.
A. Money Laundering Control Act
The U.S. money-laundering laws are perhaps the toughest in
existence. 82 In general, liability under the money laundering laws attaches
if (a) a predicate act is committed, (b) the money is then used in some
transaction, and (c) the accused participated in the transaction knowing,
or ignoring, that the money came from the unlawful act:83
(a) (1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful
activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity;
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
79.
80.
Improved
81.
82.
83.

United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
S. Comm. on Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment
Disclosure Acts of 1977, S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10-11 (1977).
See International Business Transactions, supra note 66, cmt. 7.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
Id.
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Federal law, shall be sentenced. .84
A defendant also is subject to liability for conspiring to engage in, or
aiding and abetting money laundering.
The penalties are significant. For example, each count of a § 1956
money laundering violation carries a maximum criminal penalty of 20
years imprisonment-exceeding the maximum imprisonment for an
FCPA violation-and a $500,000 fine, or twice the defendant's gross
gain or the victim's gross loss.8 5 A civil penalty of $10,000 (or the value
of the funds) also may be applied for each violation.8 6 The DOJ also can
file a forfeiture proceeding against a foreigner if the proceeds are in the
United States.8

The money-laundering laws also generally apply extraterritorially to
the acts of U.S. persons abroad and to actions taken by non-U.S. persons
inside or partially inside the United States:
There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by
this section if
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a nonUnited States citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United
States; and
(2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds
or monetary instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.88

This language makes the statute's extraterritorial reach expansive and a
valuable arrow in the prosecutor's anti-bribe-taker quiver.
In 1992, that arrow was sharpened as the MLCA made violating the
89
FCPA one of the possible predicate offenses for money laundering.
90
Although FCPA violations thus became a "specified unlawful activity"
under the statute, there was no change in the rule that a defendant who is
9
a "foreign official" and takes a bribe does not violate the FCPA. 1
Consequently, there cannot be a conspiracy charge against that foreign
official for an MLCA violation, either. 2 Thus, if the government uses the
violation of the FCPA as the predicate act against a bribe taker, the
84.
85.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), (2)(B)(ii).

86.

Id. § 1956(b)(1).

87. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (2012).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (foreign bribery became a predicate offense with the
addition of "a felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" to the list of predicate money
laundering offenses).
90. Id.
91. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 836.
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charges must necessarily rest on an expansive reading of "to promote the
carrying on of' language in the statute. 93
The Patriot Act further expanded the money-laundering laws to
include any foreign corruption, including bribery, even if it did not violate
the FCPA.94 It did so by including offenses against a foreign nation
involving bribery of a public official in its definition of the term
"specified unlawful activity":
.

(7) the term "specified unlawful activity" means-. .
(B) with respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in
part in the United States, an offense against a foreign nation
involving(iv) bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, or
embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public
official.9 5
The MLCA is also attractive for prosecutors because its provisions do not
require that defendants actually be convicted of the predicate offense.
Instead the prosecutor will arguably only need to establish that the
transaction involved proceeds that derive from the unlawful activity. The
MLCA does not, however, dispense with the required elements of
intentionality and knowledge, to wit, that "the person knew that the
property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some
form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a
felony under State, Federal or foreign law. ... " Courts have held that
the requirement of knowledge may be satisfied by proof of willful
blindness. 97 The defendant must also have knowledge of intent to
conceal-that is, the defendant must know that the "transaction is
designed in whole or in part -- to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity....
To summarize, prosecutors now, at least according to their
interpretation of the statute, may charge a foreign official with violations
of the MLCA if that official acted with the intent to promote the carrying
on of specified unlawful activity, which includes bribery; ergo-demandside prosecution.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a).
94. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv) ("an offense against a foreign nation involving ... bribery of a
foreign official, or the misappropriation, theft or embezzlement of public funds by or for the
benefit of the public official.").
95. Id. § 1956(c)(7) (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 1956(c)(1).
97. United States v. Smith, 46 F.3d 1223, 1237 (1st Cir. 1999).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
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B. PresidentialProclamation
Another handy tool is the Presidential Proclamation-in this case,
Presidential Proclamation number 7750. In it, President George W. Bush
in January 2004 allowed the U.S. Department of State to deny visas to
corrupt foreign officials, their families, and their friends. 99 By itself, the
proclamation does not have much teeth; however, the movement to allow
"no safe haven" now includes scores of countries. It is difficult to gauge
how effective this has been because visas are confidential under U.S. law.
C. Travel Act
The Travel Act was enacted in 1961, during Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy's attempts to crackdown against organized crime and
racketeering. 0 0 It targeted defendants who resided in one state while
conducting illegal activities in another.' 0 ' Kennedy wanted the federal
government to assist when local authorities were unable to prosecute
these types of crimes. 10 2 The Travel Act prohibits travel in interstate or
foreign commerce in furtherance of, among other things, unlawful
bribery:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the
mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent
to(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or . .
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any
unlawful activity ...
Shall be fined ... imprisoned. . . or both ....
(b) As used in this section 'unlawful activity' means ...
(2) extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State
in which committed or of the United States ... .103
The DOJ recently added the Travel Act to the weapons it uses to go after
foreign officials it cannot reach under the FCPA. In fact, both the DOJ
and SEC explicitly stated in their recently published Guide that they will
use the Travel Act as a means to prosecute bribery.1 0 4

99.
100.
2666.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Proclamation No. 7750, 69 Fed. Reg. 2287, 2287 (Jan. 14, 2004).
See H.R. REP. No. 87-966, at 2664-65 (1961), reprintedin 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664,
Id.
S. REP. No. 87-644, at 3-4 (1961).
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) (emphasis added).
See SEC & DOJ Guide, supra note 32, at 34.
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The Travel Act also allows the government to bring charges against
defendants that violate state commercial bribery laws: "if a company pays
kickbacks to an employee of a private company who is not a foreign
official, such private-to-private bribery could possibly be charged under
the Travel Act."10 5 Under the Travel Act, the bribe taker need not even
be a public official. It also allows prosecution when the defendant is not
an issuer under the FCPA or subject to its accounting provisions.' 06
It should be noted that courts have struggled with defining the
requisite relationship between the unlawful activity and the interstate act.
Some circuits have required more contact than others, but most hold that
the nature of the activity must be more than "incidental."'o7 On balance,
however, this application of the Travel Act provides another way to
broaden the attack on public corruption.
D. Specific Cases: From Siriwan to Gonzalez
We now examine the cases, in which prosecutors are trying all kinds
of work-arounds to criminally charge "foreign officials" for taking bribes.
1. The Thai Film Festival: Juthamas Siriwan and Jittsopa Siriwan
a. Factual Background' 0 8
The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), administered and funded
contracts to promote Thai tourism. 109 As part of its work, TAT
administered the annual Bangkok International Film Festival (Thai Film
Festival). 0 Juthamas Siriwan, known as the "Governor," was a TAT
senior officer from 2002 until 2006."' During that time she was
responsible for picking the businesses that would provide goods and
services to TAT.1 2 It is alleged that she is a "foreign official" as that term
is used in the FCPA.113
The Governor's daughter, Jittsopa Siriwan, known as Jib, was an
employee of the Thailand Privilege Card Co., an instrumentality of the
Thai government.' 14 From 2002 through 2007, husband and wife
Hollywood movie executives, Gerald and Patricia Green, received about
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 12, 34, 45.
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 682 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 670.
Indictment at 2, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2009).
Id.
Id. at 3; it is also alleged that from 2006 until 2007 she acted as an advisor to the TAT.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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5
$14 million in funds in connection with work performed for TAT."
During that same period, the Siriwans allegedly opened foreign accounts
(for example, in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Jersey, and Singapore)
6
for the receipt of crooked payments from the Greens.1 The Greens
allegedly sent at least $1.8 million of the funds they received from the
work they did for TAT to the Siriwans." 7 The alleged agreement was that
the Greens would secure lucrative TAT contracts by kicking back 10%
8
to 20% of the value of the agreements to the Governor." Most of the
transfers were by wire. 1 19
The Governor only had authority to approve TAT payments to foreign
entities up to a certain amount. 12 0 Accordingly, in an effort to conceal the
scheme, at the Governor's direction, the Greens split up the performance
of large contracts among different businesses.121 To further the coverup,
the Greens created the appearance of different businesses by using
different bank accounts, mailing addresses, and telephone numbers in
their dealings with TAT.1 2 2 But all of the Thai film festival work was
allegedly managed by the same personnel in the same place at the Greens'
direction.1 2 3 This allowed the Siriwans and the Greens to evade detection
by other Thai government officials.1 2 4 In return for the payments, the
Governor would help the Greens secure the lucrative Thai Film Festival

contracts.

12 5

b. Charges
26
The Greens were charged with violating the FCPA.1 They were
convicted in 2010 and sentenced to six months in prison.' 27 Of course,
the Greens were on the supply side of the equation-that is, they were
bribe payers explicitly targeted by the FCPA. Because the Siriwans were
bribe takers, they did not violate the FCPA.
But that did not stop the United States from bringing charges against
the Siriwans and targeting "foreign officials." In 2007, the Siriwans were

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 5 (references to TAT include other related Thai government agencies).
Id
Id
See id at 5, 8.
See id at 5.
Id at 9.

121.

See id

122. See id
123. Id at 9-10.
124. Id
125. See id. at l.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a).
127. Defendant's Appeal at 4, United States v. Gerald Green (9th Cir. 2011), No. 10-50519;
Defendant's Appeal at 4, United States v. Patricia Green, No. 10-50524 (9th Cir. 2011).

18

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 26

charged with violating and conspiring to violate the MLCA.' 2 8 The
Siriwans are the first to challenge an effort to prosecute foreign officials
not subject to FCPA liability.1 2 9 The overt acts cited in the indictment
included opening bank accounts, wiring money, and giving instructions
about dividing "commission" payments.' 3 0 Specifically, the Siriwans
were charged with an agreement to transfer money in and out of the
United States to promote the carrying on of prohibited acts:
to transport, transmit, and transfer monetary instruments and funds
from a place in the United States to a place outside the United
States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity, namely, bribery of a foreign official, a felony
violation of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd2(a)(1); bribery of a public official of Thailand, in violation of
Section 149 of Thailand's Penal Code; and the misappropriation,
theft, or embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a
public official, in violation of Section 152 of Thailand's Penal
Code, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section

1956(a)(2)(A).1'3
The government advanced essentially two theories of "specified unlawful
activity"-(1) violations of the FCPA by the Greens, and (2) violations
of Thai law.
Regardless of the final outcome, at least from a timing perspective,
including Thailand's penal code in the charges appears to have been a
tactical mistake by the prosecution, as the case has been stayed in the
United States as a result.1 32
c. The Siriwans' Arguments Regarding the Lack of a Separate and
Distinct Crime
The Siriwans argue that no money laundering could have occurred,
because the transaction "must be separate and distinct from the
underlying offense that generated the money to be laundered." 33 They
question whether the bribes can serve both as an FCPA violation and the
"separate and distinct crime" necessary to the MLCA charge against
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
129. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 9, United States v. Siriwan, No. 0900081 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 64 [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
130. Indictment at 10-11, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2009).
131. Id
132. Criminal Minutes at 1, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012),
ECF No. 90.
133. United States v. Hall, 613 F.3d 249, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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them, arguing that "Congress appears to have intended the money
laundering statute to be a separate crime distinct from the underlying
offense that generated the money to be laundered."'3 4 The Siriwans argue
that because both the MLCA and the FCPA require a money transfer as
an essential element, the alleged crimes are not separate and distinct. 3 5
They argue that only when the predicate crime becomes a completed
offense can money laundering have occurred.13 6
The government has responded by arguing that the FCPA does not
require a monetary transfer but instead only a promise of something of
value and, thus, no money needs to be transferred.1 37 Further, the
government argues that the concept of generating "ill-gotten gains"
before one is subjected to money laundering charges does not apply to
the offense the defendants are charged with-that is 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(2)(A):
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to
(2)
transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds
from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the
United States or to a place in the United States from or through a
place outside the United States
with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
(A)
unlawful activity. . . shall be sentenced ....
Based on the language in the statute, the government argues that there
is no requirement to show any proceeds of criminal activity.1 3 8 The
government argues that it only needs to show that the defendants
transmitted or attempted to transmit, funds "with the intent to promote
the carrying on of specified unlawful activity."' 39 In other words, the
government's position is that for purposes of "promoting" specified
unlawful activity under the statute, the source of the funds that serve as
the basis of the promotion is irrelevant.1 4 0 The government goes even
further and argues that because of the "no proceeds" requirement, there
is no need for a separate and distinct, specified unlawful act to occur for
it to charge a § 1956(a)(2)(A) violation.141
134. United States v. Savage, 67 F.3d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995).
135. Id.
136. United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 579-80 (11th Cir. 1997). A more recent case
on this issue is Hall. In that case, the Court rejected the government's theory and held that the

transactions were separate and distinct. Hall, 613 F.3d at 254.
137. See Government's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment at 16, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 67.
138. See id. at 7.
139. See id. at 7, 9.
140. See id. at 9.
141. See id. at 10; see United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F. 3d 670, 681 (2d Cir. 1994).
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The government relies on Krasinski, in which a defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to promote international money laundering and
to distribute the drug, ecstasy. 14 2 The court held that even though the
activities were "part and parcel of the underlying offense," they could be
considered when deciding the promotion issue. 14 3 The decision also cites
several circuit courts that have interpreted the "intent to promote"
language very broadly. 14 4
It is unclear, however, how the government intends to show that the
Siriwans in particular acted "with the intent to promote."l 4 5
d. Siriwans' Rule of Lenity Defense
The defendants also have raised the rule of lenity and due process as
a defense.1 46 The rule of lenity requires that an ambiguous criminal law
be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.1 47 The rule
"ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as
to apply it only to conduct clearly covered." 48 It "vindicates the
fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to
punishment that is not clearly prescribed."1 49 In other words, a defendant
might not have proper notice if the statute leaves unclear the possibility
that the facts supporting the predicate crime and the money laundering
may be merged into one crime. 15 0
e. Specified Unlawful Activity
2. FCPA
The defendants argue that they did not violate the FCPA because they
142. University States v. Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546, 546 (7th Cir. 2008).
143. Id. at 550-51; see Government's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Re: Intent to Promote and Organic Jurisdiction at 5, United
States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011), ECF No. 84 [hereinafter Gov't Supp.
Brief].
144. See United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1167 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Bush, 626 F.3d 527, 538 (9th Cir. 2010).
145. See Gov't Supp. Brief, supra note 143, at 5. The government relies on the concept that
at the pleading stage it "need not allege its theory of the case or supporting evidence, but only
essential facts necessary to apprise a defendant of the crime charged." United States v. Buckley,
689 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1982).
146. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 129, at 2.
147. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
148. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
149. Santos, 553 U.S. at 514.
150. See id. However, Santos has been limited to "proceeds" cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1167 (9th Cir. 2010).
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were bribe takers and not bribe givers.' 5 ' They argue that the MLCA
charge is merely an artifice to get around the FCPA's prohibition against
charging foreign officials for taking bribes.1 52 The government, of course,
argues that that is not what it is doing, arguing that: "defendants are
charged with the separate, and entirely analytically distinct, crime of
international money laundering to promote the Greens' violation of the
FCPA. That defendant Juthamas Siriwan was a foreign official at the time
of these offenses, and therefore, not charged under the FCPA does not
change the analysis."l 53 The government argues that just because foreign
officials cannot be charged with violating the FCPA, this does not mean
they have "a free pass to commit other, entirely separate, crimes." 154 in
what might be a preview of how courts will grapple with this problem,
Judge George Wu of the Central District of California was concerned that
Congress had expressed its intent to not go after foreign officials by
leaving bribe takers out of the FCPA:
[I]f ... the whole point of Congress in excepting foreign officials
is to avoid certain problems when you prosecute foreign officials
for these type of criminal acts involving bribery . .. those are the

same concerns when you attempt to go after these people for
money laundering because they accepted bribes. 5s
3. Thai law

.

Thai law also might provide the promoted "specified unlawful
activity" through an "offense against a foreign nation involving . .
bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, or
15 6
embezzlement of public funds by or for the benefit of a public official."
Judge Wu stayed the case against the Siriwans because Thai law was
asserted as a basis for the money laundering charge.' The court was
concerned about how it could determine if the Siriwans had violated Thai
law:
151. See Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 1-2, United
States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19,2011), ECF No. 64.
152. Id.
153. See Government Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment, at 22-23, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011), ECF No.
67.
154. See id. at 23-24.
155. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 10, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 07, 2012), ECF No. 91.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B)(iv) (2012).
157. Mike Dearington, From Siriwan to Gonzalez: Why the DOJ Altered the Way It Charges
Alleged Corrupt Foreign Officials, FCPA Professor (Aug. 26, 2013), www.fcpaprofessor.com/
category/siriwan.

22

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 26

Therefore, you know, especially when there are very serious
issues, it behooves the court to be somewhat cautious in this
regard. And, again, it seems to me that what will happen in
Thailand will inform this court as to what this court's proper
response should be to the motion to dismiss. And I do not feel that
it is my obligation to do that which can be done through a
prosecution in Thailand as to Thai law. You know, it behooves me
to wait and see even for no other reason that I can say, at least, they
are experts in Thailand as to what Thai law is."ss
The Court stated that an acquittal in Thailand would weaken this part
of the government's case.' 5 9 We will have to wait and see what the Thai
courts do and what Judge Wu decides to do once the Thai case is resolved.
At least in terms of charging strategy, however, the government seems
to have learned its lesson. In a subsequent case against a foreign bribe
taker, it did not include an offense against the foreign country as part of
the money-laundering charge. Instead it relied only on the FCPA and
Travel Act violations as the predicate acts required under the MLCA.
4. Maria de Los Angeles Gonzalez de Hernandez
a. Background
According to the sealed complaint, Banco de Desarrollo Economico
y Social de Venezuela (BANDES) is the state-owned and state-controlled
economic development bank of the Government of Venezuela (GOV).' 6 o
BANDES was operated by the Venezuelan People's Ministry of Planning
and Finance and acted as the financial agent of the GOV.161 Gonzalez
was allegedly BANDES's Vice-President of Finance or Executive
Manager of Finance and Funds Administration, which would make her a
foreign official under the FCPA.1 62
Tomas Clarke and Jose Hurtado worked for a broker-dealer domiciled
in the United States (the "Broker-Dealer").' 6 3 The Broker-Dealer was a
brokerage firm that had its principle offices in New York, also had offices
in Miami, and was registered with the SEC.1 6 4 Gonzalez allegedly
158. Id.; Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 24, United States v. Siriwan, No. 09-00081
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013), ECF No. 115.
159. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 10, United States v. Siriwan, No. 0900081 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 64.
160. See Sealed Complaint at 10, United States v. Bethancourt, No. 13-MAG-0683
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2,2013).
161. See id
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
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oversaw BANDES's trading abroad, including the trading by the BrokerDealer on behalf of BANDES.1 6 5 Clarke and Hurtado were accused of
paying kickback to Gonzalez in exchange for steering BANDES business
to the Broker-Dealer and authorizing it to execute bond trades for
BANDES.1 66 The money for the kickbacks allegedly came from the
revenues the Broker-Dealer generated through BANDES trading.' 67
One alleged example is that Clarke caused the Broker-Dealer to
execute at least two trades between the Broker-Dealer and BANDES for
the same bonds on the same day.1 68 If true, this would mean that
BANDES was left with the same bonds it started with, but only after
paying millions of dollars in mark-ups and mark-downs to the BrokerDealer.1 69
b. Charges
Gonzalez was charged with conspiracy to violate the Travel Act,
violation of the Travel Act, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and
money laundering.
(1) Conspiracy to violate and violation of the Travel Act
Gonzalez allegedly both conspired to and did:
[T]ravel in interstate and foreign commerce, with intent to
otherwise promote, manage establish, carry on, and facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, and carrying on of
unlawful activities, namely, (a) violations of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA ...

(b) commercial bribery, in violation of

New York State Penal Law Section 180.00 and (c) commercial
bribe receiving, in violation of New York State Penal Law 180.05;
and therefore would and did perform and attempt to perform acts
to otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, and facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment, and carrying on, of
such unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, Unites States Code,
Section 1952(a)(3)(A).1 7 0

165.
166.

See id.
See id. at 11 (alleging that Gonzalez received at least $3.6 million in payments from

the Broker-Dealer and that the Broker-Dealer generated over $60 million in revenue from

BANDES).
167. See id. at 15.
168. Id. at 14; United States v. Bethancourt, No. 13-MAG-0683 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2013).
169. See id. at 5.
170. See id. at 8.
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The alleged overt act supporting the charges includes emailing wire
instructions, emailing spreadsheets of the bond transactions and the
commissions, and wiring money.' 7 1
(2) Conspiracy to Commit and Committing Money Laundering
Gonzalez also was charged with an agreement
[T]o transport, transmit, and transfer funds from a place in the
United States to and through a place outside the United States and
to a place in the United States from a place outside the United
States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity, that is, (1) violations of the FCPA, Title 15,
United States Code, Section 78dd-2, and (2) violations of the
Travel Act, Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952(a)(2)(A).1 72
Here we see prosecutors learning the lesson of the case against the
Siriwans. Instead of charging a violation of the laws of a foreign country,
the government alleged only that the specified unlawful activity consisted
of violations of U.S. laws-the FCPA and the Travel Act. Thus, this
district court judge, unlike Judge Wu, will not be able to wait and see
what courts of a foreign country do about the claim that its laws were
violated. This should avoid stays of the proceedings and make the cases
simpler to prosecute.
There is also an interesting subplot here. Attorney General Eric
Holder co-chaired the Money Laundering Steering Committee during the
Clinton administration.1 73 He was supportive of proposals to include
"bribery of a foreign official" as part of an "offense against a foreign
nation," which is part of the MLCA's list of specified unlawful activities.
It is thus not surprising that this charge was included in the cases against
the Siriwans. It is also interesting that it was abandoned in Gonzalez.
III. CONCLUSION

So here is what we know. The DOJ and SEC have decided to go after
foreign bribe takers. In doing so, they have demonstrated a willingness to
think creatively and stretch other criminal statutes to cover conduct that
171.
(S.D.N.Y.
172.
173.
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the FCPA expressly excludes, despite the fact that Congress repeatedly,
over three decades, has expressed a legislative intent to limit foreign
corruption prosecutions to those who give bribes, not those who take
them. In so doing Congressional intent is being ignored. Let us see if
someone calls them on it. Stay tuned.
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